Comparison of situational awareness in hierarchical C2 and edge network structures by Stanton, Neville A. & Sorensen, Linda J.
 
 
 
 
 
15th ICCRTS 
“The Evolution of C2” 
 
Comparison of Situational Awareness in Hierarchical C2 and Edge Network 
Structures  
 
Paper ID: 038 
Topics: 2, 3, and 5. 
 
Ms Linda J. Sorensen 
l.j.sorensen@soton.ac.uk  
+44 2380599575 
and 
Professor Neville A. Stanton 
n.stanton@soton.ac.uk  
 
Human Factors Integration Defence Technology Centre 
Transportation Research Group 
School of Civil Engineering and the Environment 
University of Southampton 
Highfield Campus 
Southampton SO 17 1BJ 
 
 
 
 
  1 
 
Abstract 
 
The phenomenon of situational awareness (SA) has received considerable attention 
in recent years and significant theoretical advances have been made which establish 
that SA is an important component of teamwork. This is especially true in complex 
environments, such as in command and control, where the team is required to deal 
with decision-making problems under significant pressure. Two models of Team SA 
have generated interest, firstly, a model of Shared SA which describes Team SA as 
the level of overlap in common SA elements between team members (Endsley, 
1995). In contrast, the recent model of Distributed SA considers team members to 
have compatible, but not identical SA (Stanton et al., 2006). Using ELICIT, an 
intelligence gathering game, an experiment was conducted which compares the 
manifestation of team SA in a Hierarchical network structure with that of an Edge 
network structure. In addition this study considered the type of SA prevalent in the 
two network structures and measured both Shared and Distributed SA. 
Understanding the type of SA prevalent in diverse network structures is important 
when considering future developments of C2.  
 
1. Introduction 
This work is derived from the question; ‘what is the best command and control 
structure to adopt for what sort of situations’.  In our opinion Situation Awareness 
(SA) is vital to agility in network structures and its nature and operation in different 
network structures merits investigating.  
 
Stanton, Salmon, Walker and Jenkins (2010) describe three schools of thought 
regarding the phenomenon of SA, two of which we utilise here; the psychological and 
the systems ergonomics school. In the first school of thought SA is seen as a 
  2psychological phenomenon residing entirely within the mind of an individual person, 
whereas the systems ergonomics approach considers SA as an emergent property 
which arises from an agent’s interaction with the world (Stanton, Stewart, Harris, 
Houghton, Baber, McMaster, Salmon, Hoyle, Walker, Young, Linsell, Dymott and 
Green, 2006). This school see SA as a phenomenon of distributed cognition; hence 
the systems ergonomics approach sees the mind as situated within an 
interdependent relationship with the world (Stanton et al., 2010). These approaches 
are considered in greater depth in the following sections.   
 
 
1.1. Psychological approach  
The psychological school of thought considers SA as an individual characteristic, 
something which is produced and contained within the mind of an operator (Stanton 
et al., 2010). Of the contributions within this school of thought Endlsey’s (1995) three-
level model has received most attention. Endsley (1995) define SA as:  
 
“the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, 
and the projection of their status in the near future (p. 5)”. 
 
SA is perceived to consist of three separate levels, perception, comprehension, and 
projection (Endsley, 1995). By piecing together the data in the environment 
(perception) and understanding it (comprehension) the individual can make 
assumptions about the future (projection) and act accordingly.  
 
Endsley’s (1995) definition is often favoured in the literature due to its simplicity and 
ease of assessing SA. There are, however, some criticisms of the model. For 
instance, it does not explain situations in which SA is a continuous process, nor does 
it scale up to explain team SA comprehensively. According to the psychological 
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members share the same SA requirements. It has been argued by a number of 
authors (e.g. Salas, Prince, Baker and Schrestja, 1995; Masys, 2005; Salmon et al., 
2008; Stanton, Salmon, Walker and Jenkins, 2009) that team SA is more than the 
sum of its parts. As such it is not adequate to merely add individual team members’ 
SA together to provide a representation of team SA.  
 
The psychological notion of team SA emphasise the psychological qualities of the 
individual as imperative to achieve SA, relying on cognitive capabilities. For instance, 
Sarter and Woods (1991) consider SA as a variety of cognitive processing activities 
that are critical to dynamic performance. The individual develops a mental theory of 
the world that aids comprehension of how elements fit together and how future states 
of the world can be predicted (Banbury, Croft, Macken and Jones, 2004). Bedny and 
Meister (1999) argue that SA phenomena can only be understood as part of cognitive 
activity that is intensely dynamic. Similarly Artman (2000) refer to SA as ‘active 
construction of a situation model’. This emphasises the individual as being an active 
mediator in developing and maintaining SA. As the above indicates the psychological 
school of thought takes the position that several cognitive processes underlie the 
development of SA, and indeed the ability to maintain SA is challenged by the 
limitations in cognitive processing (Endsley, 1999). Attention and memory, schemata, 
mental models, goal-driven processing and experience are the most important of 
these. Their role in achieving SA and their limitations have been addressed in detail 
elsewhere (e.g. Endsley, 1995; 1999; 2000; Banks and Millward, in press).  
 
1.2. Systems approach  
The systems ergonomics school is influenced by distributed cognition (Hutchins, 
1995a, b) and sociotechnical theory (Walker et al., 2009); and takes a systems 
approach to the study of SA. Stanton et al. (2006) proposed a theory of distributed 
  4SA which consists of four theoretical concepts: schema theory, genotype and 
phenotype schema, perceptual cycle model of cognition, and the distributed cognition 
approach. This model considers SA as an emergent property of collaborative 
systems (Salmon, Stanton, Walker, Baber, Jenkins, McMaster and Young, 2008; 
Salmon et al., 2009). According to Salmon et al. (2008) distributed SA is based on:  
 
‘the notion that in order to understand behaviour in complex systems it 
is more useful to study the interactions between parts in the system and 
the resultant emerging behaviour rather than the parts themselves’ 
(p.369)’.  
 
They argue that people and artefacts comprising a system together form a “joint 
cognitive system” (Hollnagel, 2001) and that cognitive processes emerge from and 
are distributed across this system (Salmon et al., 2008). Distributed cognition is a 
function of interaction between human and technological agents involved in 
collaborative activity (Salmon et al., 2008; 2009).  
  
Smith and Hancock (1995) draw on Neisser’s (1976) model in explaining SA. They 
argue that information and action flow continuously around the cycle and;  
 
‘the environment informs the agent, modifying its knowledge. 
Knowledge directs the agent’s activity in the environment. That 
activity samples and perhaps anticipates or alters the 
environment, which in turn informs the agent (p.141)”.   
 
The distributed SA model does not discount the importance of the individual to SA, 
but rather argue that the individual is only one part of the system (Stanton et al, 
2006) They argue that an individual possesses genotype schemata that are activated 
  5by the task relevant nature of task performance (Salmon et al., 2009). During task 
performance the phenotype schema is brought to the fore in the ensuing interaction 
between the people, the world and artefacts (Salmon et al., 2009). The individual 
then is closely coupled to its environment and can therefore not be meaningfully 
analysed as separate from it (Bedny and Meister, 1999).  
 
Rather than SA being shared among team members Stanton et al. (2006) considers 
team members to possess unique but compatible parts of overall system awareness. 
It is compatible awareness that holds distributed systems together (Stanton et al., 
2006; 2009; Salmon et al., 2009). SA transactions allow agents within collaborative 
systems to enhance each other’s awareness, such as exchange of SA relevant 
information (Salmon et al., 2009). The information is being used for each agents own 
ends, integrated into their own schemata, and interpreted individually in light of their 
own tasks and goals (Salmon et al., 2008; 2009). SA in distributed teams is therefore 
enhanced through transactions, rather than being shared, and transactions update 
each agents SA (Salmon et al., 2009). Distributed SA is defined by Stanton et al. 
(2006) as:  
 
‘activated knowledge for a specific task, at a specific time within  
a system’ (p. 1291). 
 
This means that information held by the system becomes active at different points in 
time based on the goals and activities being performed and their requirements 
(Salmon et al., 2008). Each individual holds different SA for the same situation, 
depending on his or her activities and goals (Salmon et al., 2008). The connections 
between the different parts of the model are maintained where necessary, e.g. by 
communication and interaction. Communication can function as one form of SA 
transaction. The distributed SA model therefore provides the means to view: 
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‘the system can be viewed as a whole, by 
consideration of the information held by the artefacts 
and people and the way in which they interact’ 
(Stanton et al., 2010, p.5).  
 
As the above indicates a lot remains in terms of determining the type of SA which 
best explains the prevalence of it in teams. We report on a study which is part of on-
going work to identify the role of SA in different network structures performance and 
ultimately their agility. We have taken an initial step to illuminate this issue by 
comparing SA in hierarchical and Edge structures and by using the psychological 
and systems ergonomics perspectives to analyse the SA found.  
 
2. Method 
 
2.1. Participants 
A sample of 34 where drawn from the University of Southampton postgraduate 
population.  These were randomly divided in two groups, one Hierarchical and one 
Edge network condition. In the Hierarchical condition there were 17 participants with 
a mean age of 28.18, 15 of which were male and 2 were female. The Edge condition 
similarly had 17 participants, mean age of 28.67, 12 males and 5 females.  
 
2.2. Design 
This study used an ELICIT baseline approach which is of a mixed experimental 
design. The between variable is organisation type; hierarchical and edge, while the 
within subject variable is trial iteration with four factoid sets. Participants are 
randomly assigned to two groups: edge or the hierarchical group. The aim of each 
game is for the group to utilise the network structure they have been organised in to 
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combining information, posting it on relevant group web pages and sharing it with 
relevant people (Ruddy, 2007). A full explanation of the ELICIT baseline experiment 
design and procedure can be found elsewhere (for instance Ruddy, 2007).  
 
The independent variable for this study was organisation type; Hierarchical and 
Edge, while situation awareness is the dependent variable. We expected both 
conditions to have obtained some SA, however, given the notion of Shared SA as 
described above as shared SA requirements we expect the Edge condition to have a 
higher SAGAT score than that of the Hierarchical condition as the team members in 
Edge are expected to perform the same task. Further, we expected the Hierarchical 
condition to spend less time to complete the task.  
 
2.3. Analysis 
To compare difference in mean rank of SAGAT and SART scores between the two 
groups the non-parametric A Mann-Whitney test was performed. Equally a t-test was 
conducted to analyse difference in means between the two groups for SAGAT and 
SART.  
 
The ELICIT Log Analyser (CCRP, 2009) was used to extract data from the ELICIT 
software. Measures of correct identify, duration of game and sharing behaviours as 
indicated by share, post and pull were collected from the ELICIT software. In addition 
a Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) questionnaire was 
administered and a SAGAT score calculated (Endsley, 2000). The SAGAT score, 
combined with an inspection of individual responses’ overlap on specific queries, give 
an indication of Shared SA in the two conditions. SAGAT the most widely used of SA 
measures and is considered an objective measure of individuals SA (Endsley et al., 
1998). The objectivity is ensured by the freeze-probe technique which involves the 
  8simulation of any normal operation is frozen at random points in time and queries 
about the situation are asked (Endsley et al., 1998). The participants are required to 
answer each query based on the knowledge of the situation at the point of the freeze 
(Salmon et al., 2006). See Table 1 for a sample of SAGAT queries given. 
 
Table 1: Example SAGAT queries and corresponding SA levels.  
Q1  When is the terrorist incident going to happen?  Level 1 
Q2  What target is likely to be attacked?  Level 2 
Q3  When are they going to strike?  Level 1 
Q4 
Based on the information you were given throughout the 
mission what did you think the terrorist group would do?  Level 3     
 
 
A SAGAT score is calculated for each participant after the simulation. The operator’s 
perceptions are compared to the actual state of the environment to provide an 
objective measure of the operators SA (Endsley and Rodgers, 1996). Although 
heavily criticised when used to provide a team SA score the SAGAT scores of the 
individual in the team is averaged to provide an overall team SA score (Salas, Prince, 
Baker and Schrestja, 1995; Masys, 2005; Salmon et al., 2008; Stanton, Salmon, 
Walker and Jenkins, 2009).  
 
A Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) questionnaire was also used 
(Taylor, 1990). SART is also a popular measure of SA and provides an assessment 
of SA based on an operators’ subjective opinion (Endsley et al. 1998). It consists of 
14 components which are determined in relation to their relevance to the task or 
environment under study (Endsley et al. 1998). The operators are required to rate on 
a series of bipolar scales the degree to which they perceive a) a demand on their 
resources, b) a supply of resources available to them, and c) their understanding of 
the situation (Endsley et al., 1998). The scales are combined to provide an overall 
measure of SA (Endsley et al., 1998). The popularity of particularly SAGAT, but also 
  9SART, can not be ignored when studying SA and as such their fitness for purpose in 
relation to ELICIT studies was sought tested in this study.  
 
Distributed SA was measured using Critical Decision Method (CDM) which were 
analysed using a thematic analysis and frequency of word count to produce 
propositional networks which reflects the ‘object-relation-subject’ patterns within the 
CDM (Salmon et al., 2009b; Klein, 2000). Propositional Networks as an analytical 
and representational tool for Distributed SA are discussed in detail in Salmon et al. 
(2009b).  
 
2.4. Limitations 
This study is not without its limitations; foremost of these is the weakness of a single 
experiment. Further studies, if similar in results, will strengthen the indicative results 
reported here. Administrating the SAGAT as a freeze-probe technique was not 
possible as the ELICIT software does not allow moderators to pause the game. It is 
therefore possible that our results have been confounded by too high a reliance on 
memory, leading to the low scores seen here. This effect was sought mediated by 
the immediate administration of the questionnaire upon ending the game. Other 
methods which may perhaps constitute a better fit with ELICIT may be; Situation 
Awareness Rating Scales (SARS; Waag and Houck, 1994), NASA TLX (Hart and 
Staveland; 1988, cited in Stanton et al., 2005) and Event Analysis of Systemic Team 
Work (EAST; Stanton, Baber and Harris, 2008). The findings presented here are 
merely indicative and further work should seek to explore the role of SA in network 
structures agility.   
 
 
 
 
  103. Results 
Here we briefly present the results for the two conditions. Firstly, we look at the 
findings of relevance to Shared SA, the ELICIT measures of Identify, time and 
sharing behaviours. Finally, we consider Distributed SA.   
 
3.1. Shared SA  
The SAGAT probes were developed from the factoids provided in the game 
according to the three levels of SA described above. The highest possible score was 
21 for both conditions. The individual SAGAT scores were calculated separately for 
each team member and a mean obtained. A score of 12.12 was obtained for the 
Hierarchical condition while 12.59 was obtained for the Edge condition (see figure 1 
and 2), neither score more than just over half of the maximum score. It should be 
noted that there was one response missing in the Hierarchical condition.  
 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchical network structure’s SAGAT score. 
 
 
Figure 2: Edge network structure’s SAGAT score. 
 
Contrary to expectation the difference between the two conditions is marginal. 
Indeed the slight difference might be wholly explained by the one missing response 
in the Hierarchical condition. A Mann-Whitney test was performed to investigate 
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exceeded the critical level for U at 0.05. Consequently we did not find a difference 
between Hierarchy and Edge for the SAGAT measure.   
 
By way of contrast to the SAGAT score, a SART questionnaire was administered at 
the end of the game to allow individual subjects to rank their own SA. Here too we 
found little difference between the average SART score Hierarchical and Edge, 5.56 
and 5.94 respectively. A Mann-Whitney test was performed to investigate difference 
in SART score between the two groups. The Mann-Whitney of .786 exceeded the 
critical level for U at 0.05. As such we did not find a difference between the groups. 
Figure 3 and 4 show the spread of the SART scores. Although there is more 
variation in terms of scores obtained these confirm the above finding.  
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Figure 3: Spread of SART scores            Figure 4: Spread of SART scores 
 
3.2. ELICIT measures 
In the Hierarchical condition the Cross-Team Coordinator correctly identified the 
solution (see Table 2); while in Edge three team members correctly identified the 
solution (see Table 3). We, therefore, found no difference in correct identify between 
the two conditions as both successfully completed their team task (only Cross-Team 
Coordinator could be expected to identify in the Hierarchical condition).   
 
  12 
 
Table 2: Correct identify for the Hierarchical condition 
 
Strict 
Scoring 
Number of Correct Ids   1 (Alex) 
Earliest Correct Id   1881 sec 
Correct Ids / Total Actions  0.001321004
Correct Ids / Time   0.00144648 
 
 
Table 3: Correct identify for the Edge condition 
 
Strict 
Scoring 
Number of Correct Ids   3 
Earliest Correct Id   952 sec 
Correct Ids / Total Actions
 
0.002714932
Correct Ids / Time 
 
0.004619649
 
 
There was a difference, however, in the earliest correct identification which was at 
952 seconds for the Edge condition. In contrast the Hierarchical conditions solution 
came almost twice as late at 1881 seconds.   
 
Sharing behaviours were measured in terms of direct sharing of factoids between 
participants in each condition, posts on topic specific websites and pull from such 
websites by participants. The two conditions exhibited only a small difference in 
terms of number of posts; with 130 in the Edge condition compared to the 111 for the 
Hierarchical condition. There was considerably more direct sharing in the 
Hierarchical condition than in Edge, 231 against 48 respectively. In terms of pulls we 
found a larger number of pulls in the Edge condition, 747, than in the Hierarchical 
condition which had 167. See Table 4 for summary.  
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exchange 
Hierarchy Edge 
Posts 130  111 
Share 48  231 
Pull 747  167 
Total 925  509 
Table 4: Summary table of information exchange  
 
 
3.3. Distributed SA  
The CDM responses were analysed using a thematic analysis and frequencies of 
words were counted. Figure 5 and 6 represent the frequency scores obtained and 
the cut-off point drawn for the words to be included in the propositional networks. For 
the Hierarchical condition the cut-off point was 4, hence no words mentioned fewer 
than 4 times were included. For the Edge condition the cut-off point was 5 individual 
listings.  
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Figure 5: Frequency of words for the Hierarchical condition.  
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Figure 6: Frequency of words for the Edge condition.   
 
Propositional networks have been put forward as a means to describe a systems SA, 
representing the information underlying a systems knowledge and relationship 
between these (Salmon et al., 2009). Figure 7 depicts the propositional network 
created of the subject>relation>object patterns in the CDM responses in the 
Hierarchical condition, Figure 8 for the Edge condition. The propositional network 
represents a systems level depiction of the Distributed SA contained within the 
network structure.  
 
 
  15 Figure 7: Propositional Network; DSA of Hierarchical condition  
 
 
 Figure 8: Propositional Network; DSA of Edge condition 
 
Although the propositional networks contain some of the same information elements 
there are a number of different concepts which are exclusive to each network 
  16structure, for instance “receive” is only contained within the Hierarchical structure 
while process is unique to the Edge structure. The concepts relationships reflect the 
different ways in which the network structures utilise the information available and 
the knowledge each system contains. Whereas it was not possible to say there was 
a difference between the SA in the two conditions when considering Shared SA we 
can see that there is a clear difference between the Hierarchy and Edge conditions in 
terms of their Distributed SA. In the following we discuss the implications of these 
findings.  
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
We expected to find a difference between the Hierarchical and Edge conditions when 
analysing SA as Shared SA as measured by SAGAT and SART. However, the non-
parametric tests and the near-equal means obtained for each Shared SA measure 
did not reveal any difference between the two network structures. Within the 
psychological school of thought Shared SA is understood as shared SA 
requirements for team members (Endsley, 1995). As such we would have expected 
the Edge organisation, in which all team members share the same team role and 
task responsibility, to obtain a high SAGAT score. This was not supported in our 
findings. Similarly, the low score obtained for the Hierarchical condition does not 
indicate a particularly high degree of overlap in SA requirements within this team.  
 
We did find, however, some difference in the patterns of sharing behaviour between 
the two groups. This may indicate that although both networks successfully 
completed their task and identified the solution the manner in which they approached 
the process of problem solving differed. For instance, in the Edge network there were 
few direct shares but a high number of pulls from the respective intelligence web 
  17sites. Although no conclusive evidence exists it may appear as if the Edge network is 
more individual-oriented while the Hierarchical network structure appears more 
team-oriented in their task. The clear division of roles and task responsibility which is 
prevalent in the Hierarchy, but lacking in the Edge network, may account for these 
differences.  
 
The systems approach, in contrast to the notion of team SA as being shared, argues 
that SA is an emergent property of collaborative systems. The qualitative findings 
represented in the propositional networks reflect such systems. The individual team 
member is only one part of this system and each has awareness which is different 
but compatible to that of other team members. According to Stanton et al. (2006) 
compatible awareness form the glue which holds the distributed system together. 
They argue further that Distributed SA is activated knowledge, which is activated at 
any time for a particular task within the system. The findings represented in the 
propositional networks show the summative knowledge contained within the network 
and the relational links between them show how these knowledge structures were 
activated at different points in the task performance. We therefore argue that both 
network structures exhibited Distributed SA.   
 
Although no difference in SA was found between the Hierarchy and Edge conditions 
for Shared SA we did reveal a difference in Distributed SA. This is evident where 
knowledge items are held by one structure but not the other, such as Process which 
was held by the Edge network but not Hierarchy. The content of the propositional 
networks strengthen the pattern seen in the sharing behaviours. Conceptual items in 
the propositional network reflect a team-oriented approach for the Hierarchical 
structure and an individual-oriented approach for Edge where each team member 
seem to problem solve as if they were working alone. The relational links between 
concepts are also different in the two network structures, reflecting different paths of 
  18knowledge activation within the collaborative system. See Table 5 for a summary of 
key findings. Further work is needed to quantify these initial qualitative findings for 
firmer conclusions to be drawn.    
 
Table 5: Summary of key findings  
 Performance  Diagnostics 
Org type    SAGAT  SART  PN/SNA 
Hierarchical  1881 sec  12.12   5.56   Different content of information  
 Different activation of same 
knowledge  
Edge  952 sec   12.59  5.94   Different content of information  
 Different activation of same 
knowledge 
 
In our opinion SA is vital to agility in network structures and we believe its operation 
in different network structures merits investigating. In particular we believe that the 
notion of Distributed SA should be explored as a function of agility. Understanding 
whether there are differences between the prevalence of SA in different network 
structures and the nature of that SA as being either Shared or Distributed will 
contribute to developing the field of command and control research.  
  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study showed little difference between the Hierarchy and the Edge networks 
when considering the SAGAT and SART results, suggesting that they were not 
sensitive to the differences of SA between the two network structures, whereas the 
Distributed SA method revealed qualitative differences in the underlying schemata of 
the teams in question. This suggests that allowing the participants to freely express 
the ways in which they make decisions, through an open-ended CDM questionnaire 
and then performing content analysis is more likely to reveal differences in distributed 
cognition and SA than a prefabricated set of probes and rating scales. This paper 
sheds some light on the difficulty of measuring SA quantitively in experimental 
  19designs, however, in applying alternative approaches such as Social Network 
Analysis and Propositional Networks we believe we highlight a method which may 
overcome these in measuring team SA in ELICIT studies as well as elsewhere. 
Further studies utilising the DSA framework measured with Social Network Analysis 
and Propositional Networks should be conducted to further investigate whether these 
reveal more of the differences between Hierarchical and Edge networks than those 
SA methods which have been more commonly used.   
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